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STOIC VALUES
I
One of the most puzzling things position concerning the so-called "indifferent", (adiaphora). 
Let me summarize it. The Stoics seem to hold that all states of affairs other than virtue (arete) 
are indifferent as to goodness. At the same time they seem to think that virtue is partially 
constituted by a propensity to choose certain such indifferent states of affairs. For they 
maintain that the end (telos), which they identify with virtue and the sole good, is "to live in 
agreement with nature" (homologoumenos tel physei zen), in a sense that is taken to involve 
selecting things that are in accord with nature, even though these things, it seems, are 
indifferent. They make two seemingly within the class of indifferents, one between things that 
are "preferred" (proegmena)-and things that are dispreferred" (apoproegmena), and another 
between "appropriate acts" (kathekonta) and others. All of this is well known and 
uncontroversial.
But this position raises problems that have been felt since antiquity. The one on which I wish 
to concentrate is this. It seems puzzling that the.,, condition that is the end and the sole good 
shout part a propensity to choose or do .things that are indifferent, i.e., neither good nor bad. 
And although the Stoics at first seem to mitigate our puzzlement by saying that the things to 
be chosen or done do indeed have a kind of value which they call axia or "worth," they 
immediately puzzle us all over again by insisting that this kind of value is not any kind of 
goodness and cannot possibly be measured against the value of virtue.
Let us try to turn our puzzlement into more precisely stated problems. To begin with, it seems 
at first sight reasonable to think that the goodness .of a propensity to make a certain kind of 
choice should derive in one of three ways, either 1) from the goodness of the consequences of 
the making of the choice, or 2) from the goodness of what the choice is a choice of, i.e., its 
intentional object, or 3) from the goodness of a particular way of going about making the 
choice. The first view is straightforwardly consequentialist. The second way is not 
consequentialist, because what is chosen to happen may not actually result from the choice. 
The third way is the sort of way that Kant uses, which makes the goodness of the choice and 
the propensity to make it a function of the way in which it is made.
The Stoics, however, seem to have followed none of these ways. They say nothing, concrete, 
about how a virtuous person should go about making choices, comparable to what Kant says 
about the procedure f following the categorical imperative. And they expressly deny that most 
of the things chosen are themselves good. And although they do attribute the other kind of 
value, "worth," to the things that are chosen, they do not seem to explain what it is about that 
kind of value that renders good the propensity to choose things that have it. So what, if 
anything, can be said about why virtue is good? And why is its being good not actually 
undermined by the fact that it is a propensity to choose things that are neither good nor bad? 
Or if those things' having another sort of value is what makes virtue good, how does that come 
about? That is, how could choosing something with that other sort of value make the choosing 
of it good? Or if something else makes it good, what is that something else? Or is the 
goodness of virtue simply a brute fact that cannot be explained?
We can also articulate our puzzlement in a different way. Given that the virtuous person is held 
by the Stoics to be rational and to choose in accordance with reason (logos), we must wonder 
what the character of this reason is. In particular, what can be rational about a person who 
chooses A over B even though neither is either good or bad? If A and B are thus indifferent, 
then why does the perfectly virtuous and rational person think that there is anything to choose 
between them? How does such a person justify to himself the decision to do A on the basis of 
its "worth" even as he tells himself that it has no more goodness than B?
The same questions can be raised, moreover, about the person who is not perfectly virtuous 
and wise but who is trying to become so (the person who, in Stoic terms, is "making progress," 
prokopton, toward virtue). Why does it make sense for such a person to choose things that he 
is told he is supposed to come to regard as neither good nor bad? And how is it psychologically 
possible for him to do so? As the very history of the discussion of Stoicism shows, most people 
find it impossible to see how they could bring themselves to decide to do A rather than B if 
they are told that neither is better than the other.
Likewise, mutandis, we must wonder why this propensity to choose certain indifferents 
deserves the title 'virtue' to begin with. What can be virtuous about a person who chooses one 
thing over another even though both are indifferent as to goodness? Once again, how does the 
fact that a thing possesses this other kind of value make the choosing of it virtuous in any 
reasonable sense of that term?
These, then, are some of the problems that the Stoic position on indifferents raises. All of them 
challenge the coherence of (a) recommending that we make choices among things that are all 
said to be indifferent as to goodness and badness, and of (b) claiming that the propensity to 
do so is both (i) virtuous, (ii) rational, and (iii) the state of a human being that is good and the 
end.
Notice that these problems are quite distinct from another problem that might seem obviously 
to be good. The Stoic view on these matters certain particular things, such as pain and 
sickness, that might seem obviously to be bad, and certain other particular things, such as 
pleasure and health, that might seem obviously to be good. The Stoic view on these matter 
certainly seems peculiar and deserves discussion on its own account. Here, however, I am 
dealing with something else, namely, the combination of their claim that virtue is good with the 
claim that it involves a propensity to choose things that are themselves indifferent as to 
goodness.
II
The scholarly literature on Stoicism provides little elucidation of what the Stoic answers to 
these problems might be. Since we have only scanty records of what they actually said about
the issue, and since the records that we have do not attack the problems in a direct or 
systematic way, we are forced to think philosophically about what would have been reasonable 
for them to say, and then see whether the evidence makes it plausible that they did in fact say 
it. Unfortunately, most commentators have found the Stoic view sufficiently mystifying that 
they have seldom proceeded very far in this direction. Still, there are some attempts to provide 
illumination that deserve attention.
One attempt can, I think, be put aside right away. This is the view that originally the Stoics did 
not wish to make any evaluative distinctions among indifferents, but simply called everything 
except virtue indifferent and left it at that. Later, this story goes, they discovered that they • 
were being criticized for not providing a believable action-guide for ordinary people, and so 
grudgingly modified their original view by granting that the distinction between, e.g., the 
preferred and the dispreferred is a genuine evaluative distinction.1 But this story is 
unsatisfactory. The evidence for the alleged chronological change is very weak.2 Moreover the 
story represents the Stoics as utterly insensitive to the real philosophical difficulties that are 
raised by the claim, which some of them unquestionably made, that goodness and "worth" are 
two distinct and incommensurable sorts of value. But there is equally unquestionable evidence 
that these difficulties were raised against them, and that they did make some sort of effort to 
meet them.3
At the same time we must beware of temptingly simple ways of explaining the relation 
between these two kinds of value. One such way would be to say that the value that 
indifferents can have is simply an instrumental value, some kind of conduciveness to virtue. 
There seems to be no evidence for this interpretation, and to my knowledge it has not been 
explicitly defended, though some interpretations perhaps implicitly suggest it.4
One might also hope to interpret the Stoic view wholly by means of the Kant's distinction 
between conditional and unconditional goods, to which it gave rise. In fact, the Stoics' way of 
arguing that virtue is the only good is precisely to maintain that virtue is the only thing that is 
beneficial to a person in any and all possible circumstances.s So like the good will in Kant's 
ethics, virtue is indeed unconditionally good, and other things are only con-ditionally beneficial. 
Moreover there is another similarity. A good will for Kant is a will that wills things that are at 
best only conditionally good, just as virtue is for the Stoics the propensity to choose things that 
only have value other than goodness. So is the Stoic view not very like Kant's?
Yes, in some ways, but there are crucial differences. For one thing, Kant does not deny that 
conditional goodness is a kind of goodness, so his view does not have the paradoxical look that 
the Stoics' position does. More importantly, though, Kant's description of the categorical 
imperative in all its formulations provides an acount of how a good will deliberates and decides 
that is at least an attempt to make us understand what is both good and rational about it. 
Nothing in the Stoic position provides the same kind of explanation as these deliberative 
procedures. That is why we are now looking for some other way of understanding how the 
propensity to choose indifferents could be virtuous, rational, and the end.
Finally, one might think that because the two kinds of value are said to be incommensurable, 
there is simply nothing to be said about their relation to each other, that is, they are simply 
two different kinds of value that human beings can be concerned about, and that is that.
But the Stoics make it clear that there is indeed something to say about the relation between 
goodness and "worth." They are clearly not just two incommensurable values on a par with 
each other. For it is absolutely plain that goodness is, in some sense, more important than the 
other sort of value; as the end, it is the value that "really counts."6 Most importantly, however, 
it is clear that if the Stoic view is to be made much sense of, there must be something to be
said about the relation between their two sorts of value. This is so precisely because the thing 
that has the one is a propensity to choose things having the other, and as we have seen they 
need to explain how this can be so. As critics since antiquity have recognised, it seems prima 
facie paradoxical to say that a good state of a person can consist in a propensity to make 
certain choices, but that the things chosen are not under any circumstances to the called good. 
What-one can reasonably ask--is the point of making such choices? It is no reply to say 
merely that there is some quite different sort of value that these things have, which makes the 
propensity to choose them something good. That is no reply, that is, unless one is prepared to 
explain the connection between things' having that kind of value and its being good to have a 
propensity to choose them, or else to say what else--a Kantian way of arriving at the choice, 
for example--makes that propensity good. Perhaps the Stoics failed to give a satisfactory 
explanation, but the evidence is clear that they tried,7 and we shall see that in fact they had 
something quite substantial to say about the problem.
m
In addition to the foregoing suggestions, two recent accounts of the Stoics need to be 
considered, one by Terence Irwin and the other by Gisela Striker.8
As Irwin points out, the Stoics conceded that they had to accord some kind of value to 
indifferents. For if indifferents had no kind of value at all, they agreed, it would make no sense 
to describe virtue as essentially involving choices among them, or indeed, as having any 
connection with the world at all.9 Our question, though, is whether the particular kind of value 
that they do accord to indifferents makes it understandable that virtue should involve choices 
among them.
Here, according to Irwin, the Stoics' response is simply that that value--axia or "worth," which 
Irwin follows Antipater of Tarsus in calling "selective value"--"does not depend on a relation to 
an end."10 The end for human beings is indeed virtue, Irwin says, but there can also be what 
he calls an "objective," 11 e.g., of a craft, which is not the end and indeed is not even the end 
of that craft.12: In fact, as I understand Irwin, there may simply be no systematic connection 
between the end of the craft and the realization of the objective, and the craftsman operating 
with both may realize that there is no such connection. 13 The Stoics, he says, reject Aristotle's 
position, that "every object of rational concern and value must be related to [the end, namely,] 
happiness." "They do not recognize two ends; but they recognise two objects of ultimate 
concern, virtue and the life according to nature .... „14
I do not think that we can be content with this account of the Stoic position. It is 
philosophically unsatisfactory to picture the various human "objectives" as being without any 
systematic connection at all to the human end. It would mean, as I have alrady urged, that 
there would be nothing to be said about what makes our "objectives" such that a propensity to 
adopt them deserves to be called virtue, or rational. This seems like an intolerable situation. 
Moreover, as we shall see, there is every reason to believe that the Stoics did try to make a 
connection. Irwin is quite correct that they did not think that the "objectives" derive their value 
from being conducive to the end. The connection is more involved than that. But still, we shall 
see (sec. VI), there is a connection.
As Striker puts it, the problem for the Stoics is that they "had to show that it is not absurd to 
choose something, the obtainment of which is indifferent for the goal of life."15 To this end, 
Striker's account uses three distinct ideas. One is derived from Antipater, whose claim seems to 
have been that the Stoic position could be elucidated by the so-called "stochastic" crafts, such 
as archery, for which "success... is not the standard for judging the capabilities of the artist or 
even the correctness of his action in an individual case," because the presence o f significant 
contingencies makes such a standard unreasonble. In such crafts, according to Striker, "the
intended result is not identical with the goal of the entire craft, and... one can achieve the goal 
even without achieving the result." Examples from such crafts, moreover, are said to be 
"particularly suited for showing that it is possible to work for something, the obtaining of which 
is a matter of indifference."16 The point, according to Striker, is that because of uncontrollable 
and unpredictable contingencies, such as sudden gusts of wind, it is impossible to be certain 
that even a well aimed arrow will hit the target, and so the goal or end of archery must rather 
be to shoot in the proper way or with the proper form, not actually to hit the target after all.
As Striker points out, though, if this idea is supposed to illuminate the Stoic position by means 
of facts about our actual attitudes toward these crafts, it will not work. 17 Doctors, who are up 
against contingencies, still want to cure patients. Clearly archers want to hit targets and don't 
want winds to blow their arrows askew, and therefore they wait, when they can, for gusts of 
wind to pass. And try telling a golfer that as long as his form is good, his bali's being blown 
into a pond is a matter of indifference. It is perfectly true that according the Stoics, the wise 
man is supposed to be untroubled by the failure of his efforts because of contingencies, but 
this use of the archery example does not explain their account of ends and objectives. 18
In order to explicate the Stoic position, then, Striker next tries a second idea. It concerns 
pursuits, like the playing of certain games, in which two goals can interact in complicated 
ways. 19 In the case that Striker describes, a person temporarily adopts the attitude of 
pursuing the goal of winning as ultimate, even though it is in his fixed view subordinate to his 
truly ultimate goal of getting vigorous exercise.20 Though Striker takes this case to involve 
stochastic crafts, contingency really has nothing to do with this case, which could obtain even 
if winning and exercising were certain outcomes of an entirely non-stochastic pursuit. More 
importantly, this case does not show that winning is "indifferent" in the sense that the Stoics 
had in mind. It could only show, at best, that winning is only an instrumental good, pursued 
for the sake of exercise, though while one is caught up in the game one pretends that winning 
is good in itself. (As people actually play games, of course, they usually feel that both winning 
and the effort to win are good partly for themselves and partly instrumentally.) So the only 
way to make this sort of case serve the Stoics' defense is to take them to hold merely that 
states of affairs other than virtue are valuable only as contributing to virtue, though sometimes 
in order to obtain or preserve virtue we have to pretend to value them for their own sakes too. 
But Striker does not take them this way, and in any case we have seen that there is no 
evidence for it (sec. II).
Striker seems to concede this defect in the game analogy too, and so finally she introduces 
what appears to be a third idea, which is very similar to Irwin's approach.21 It is simply the 
claim that "it is not absurd to refer appropriate action to something other than the goal of life," 
and that "lilt is simply wrong to assume that there can be only one reference point of all 
action."22: Since Striker does not go on to suggest what the connection might be between the 
goal of life and the other "reference point[s]" of action, this seems tantamount to saying that 
there need be no connection at all. But our earlier considerations show that that is not a 
satisfactory result, and so we must look further.
IV
The challenge to the Stoics, we saw, was to defend the coherence of (a) recommending that 
we make choices among things that are all said to be indifferent in respect of goodness and 
badness, and of (b) claiming that the propensity to do so is (i) virtuous, (ii) rational, and (iii) 
the end. Remember, once again, that we are not trying to show that the Stoics are reasonable 
in holding that other things besides virtue (and vice) are indifferent. Rather, we are only trying 
to see whether it is coherent to combine that claim with the claim that the goal, i.e., the 
virtuous state, i.e., the rational state, of a human being is a propensity to choose from among 
those indifferents.
Let me make and very briefly explain an idea about how we might do this. I shall not be able 
to deal with all questions and doubts but I hope to be able to make it clear enough to seem 
worth serious consideration.
I shall begin with some relatively uncontroversial points about the Stoic position. As we saw, 
according to the Stoic view as it is standardly interpreted certain types of acts are "appropriate 
acts" (kathekonta), and certain types of things are "preferred" (proegmena). The relation 
between these two notions is tricky, but we do not need to explore it fully here. Preferred 
things are things to which we are naturally drawn or impelled (we have a horme toward them). 
Appropriate acts are those acts that "have a reasonable defense" (eulogos apologia).23 
Presumably some appropriate acts will be acts whereby one attempts to obtain things that are 
preferred, but many will not be, and some attempts to obtain things that are preferred might in 
some circumstances be the opposite of appropriate. 24
It thus turns out that, according to the Stoics, most of the judgments in which we classify 
particular acts or things as appropriate or preferred are somewhat like what W. D. Ross called 
prima facie judgments, which may have to be revised when further facts and considerations 
come to light. A type of act that is generally appropriate will almost always have instances that 
are inappropriate in the actual circumstances, and the same holds mutatis mutandis for types 
of things that are preferred. In general the types of action that we naturally pick out are only 
approximations of what is in fact to be done or to be selected. And the fact that any act or 
thing seems at first sight to fit into one of these evaluative categories is, in and of itself, no 
guarantee that that act or thing is to be done or selected in those particular circumstances. If 
the circumstances are discovered to be different from normal, what seems like an appropriate 
act,.for example, may well turn out to be inappropriate. 25
What distinguishes the sage from ordinary people, on the Stoic view as it is standardly 
interpreted, is that the sage possesses a complete under-standing of the structure of events, 
so that he knows everything that he needs to know in order to understand the relevant 
considerations concerning everything that he might do. In this sense, the acts that the sage 
performs fit, as he sees them, into the right sort of pattern or structure with all of the other 
acts that he performs. It is not clear whether the Stoics think that his knowledge can be 
formulated in rules or generalizations,26 but that is not important for our purposes. Moreover 
this knowledge causes the sage to have propensities to perform acts and make choices not 
only in the particular present case, but in all other cases as well, so that he possesses a firm 
and unshakeable disposition always to act and choose correctly.27
It is only slightly less uncontroversial that the acts that the sage performs are all appropriate 
acts, the very same appropriate acts that might be performed by anyone else. An act 
performed by a sage is a katorthoma, a "right act." But every "right act" is also an "appropriate 
act," kathekon, and what makes the difference between them is the state of mind with which 
they are performed. You could not tell whether an act was merely a kathekon rather than also 
a katorthoma just by looking at the act itself without also knowing the state of mind of the 
person performing it. Moreover what makes the sage's state of mind distinctive is simply that 
he possesses the complete knowledge just mentioned whereas the other person does not.28
From these well understood features of the Stoic position, however, we can develop a quite 
straightforward answer to our questions about indifferents.
The crucial fact is that even when the sage and the ordinary person perform what is outwardly 
the very same act, they conceive of that act in quite different ways.29 To the ordinary person, 
the act will be seen as falling under a type, such as honoring one's parents, for which there is a 
"reasonable defense.30 These types include those that appear in the various precepts that we
employ in ordinary deliberation and teaching.31 Thus for the ordinary person a particular 
action will seem justified qua falling under the concept or predicate, honoring one's parents, or 
perhaps some wider predicate under which it is subsumed.32 For the sage, on the other hand, 
it will recommend itself in a rather different way. it will be seen primarily under the very 
general notion: fitting into the whole structure of acts that it is appropriate for him (and 
others) to perform. And it will be seen in this way only by the sage, because only the sage, 
according to the Stoics, is in a position to comprehend all of his actions within a systematic and 
coherent picture.33
This cardinal feature of the sage needs emphasis, because it is obscured in another line of • 
interpretation which focuses mainly on the sage's way of coping with contingency. We saw 
some of this idea in the interpretations of Irwin and Striker, though their real focus was 
elsewhere. A more thoroughgoing use of this idea is found in Inwood's account. According to 
it, the act of the sage that is really a right act, and that the sage really aims for "without 
reservation," turns out not to be ordinary external acts, but "doing one's best" to do those acts 
(e.g., visiting one's parents for Thanksgiving). For this act of "doing one's best' (unlike the act 
of actually visiting one's parents) is immune from external contingencies and cannot fail to be 
carried out successfully?
Although an important element of the Stoic view undoubtedly does concern the proper attitude 
toward contingencies (an element that gained more prominence, it seems, it later Stoicism), 
this attitude cannot be either the main characteristic distinguishing the sage from the ordinary 
person or the answer to our original problem. It might seem to answer our problem, because it 
might seem to make it disappear. That problem, remember, was to see how virtue could 
involve aiming to do things that are indifferent. But if the sage's aim is only to "do his best" to 
perform certain acts, and if (as Inwood claims) this itself is a "right" act, then the sage's 
propensity is no longer to do things that are indifferent. Unfortunately, however, a new 
problem emerges in place of the old one. For on this view the sage aims, not to do certain 
sorts of acts, but to do his best to do those same sorts of acts. But if it was problematical 
before to say that virtue involves aiming to do things that are indifferent, it is not a bit less 
problematical to say that virtue involves aiming to do one's best to do things that are 
indifferent.
Thus, even if we say that the sage's actual expectation is only that he will do his best to do 
certain things (and Inwood and others may conceivably be right about this), we must also 
recognize the crucial difference between, on the one hand, the sage's comprehension of the 
whole pattern into which his acts fit and, on the other hand, the ordinary person's piecemeal 
way, type-by-type and justiflcation-by-justification, of regarding his acts (even if the particular 
acts happen to be just the same). And the evidence is clear that the Stoics emphasized this 
difference, and did not merely distinguish the two by their respective attitudes toward 
contingency.
The sage and the ordinary person, then, conceive of their acts in different ways. But of course 
the sage is capable of realizing that a particular act that he undertakes qua "act that fits into 
the unique coherent pattern of action" can also be seen by him as an "act of honoring one's 
parents." But plainly it is qua falling under the former concept, not qua falling under the latter, 
that the sage decides on and undertakes the action. Thus the sage is distinguished from the 
ordinary person by knowing two things: (I) there might, as we have seen, always turn out to 
be circumstances in which honoring one's parents was not appropriate; ( 2) what 
fundamentally recommends the act is not the fact that it falls under such a concept as 
"honoring one's parents," but rather the fact that it fits into the overall pattern of acts that the 
sage himself comprehends.
But if this is so, then clearly the sage can have two simultaneous attitudes toward one and the 
same act. He approves of the act qua fitting into the pattern that he comprehends, which gives 
it its status as a "right act," but he is indifferent toward it qua merely falling under the type, 
e.g., "honoring one's parents," that gives it its status as a merely /appropriate act." The Stoic 
claims about the end of life make it inevitable that the sage will have to have this dual attitude 
toward acts (and, mutatis mutandis, things that are preferred and dispreferred). The end, we 
saw, was "living in accord with nature."35 This idea received various formulations by different 
Stoics, whose purposes need not be discussed here, but all of them show that living in accord 
with nature is taken to involve using one's understanding of nature to make decisions in accord 
with nature about what to choose and do. The sage, who has attained this end, must therefore 
choose things that he regards as being in accord with nature. But regarding them in this way is 
different from regarding them as falling under the various concepts that show them as 
preferred or appropriate.36
There is far too much to say here about how the Stoics conceived this notion of a coherent 
pattern of action, but it is important to mention one point. As is well known, the Stoics believe 
in an intimate connection between the coherent pattern of things that ought to be chosen and 
the orderly structure of the kosmos as it in fact develops over time. Though the former seems 
like an evaluative matter and the latter seems like a factual one, the Stoics evidently do not 
see the kind of sharp difference between them that some other philosophers have? For them, 
the sage's knowledge of how to act and what to choose is inseparable from his knowledge of 
how things actually work in nature.
Fortunately, our purposes here do not require us to explore this matter further. As everyone 
agrees, the inseparability of the sage's evaluative-seeming knowledge from his factual-seeming 
knowledge has something to do, on the Stoic view, with the sage's ability to realize that all 
events that actually occur are part of the pattern of nature and pro tanto to be approved of or 
at least in some sense accepted? But just as it is difficult to be sure how they think the sage's 
comprehension of the right way to act is framed in his own mind, it is equally unclear how they 
think the sage's knowledge of nature is formulated, and consequently it is unclear precisely 
how they think these two kinds of knowledge are related. But we do not need to solve these 
problems here. The crucial thing to recognise is that the sage is supposed to understand the 
whole pattern of acts that are to be performed. The connection of that pattern with the pattern 
of the actual workings of the kosmos can for present purposes be treated as a separate issue.
V
But so far we only have part of the answer to our problem. For to see that the same thing can 
be regarded both as indifferent and nevertheless also as preferable, under two different 
concepts, is still not to see the connection between these two concepts. As I have insisted, we 
must still ask why virtue involves the propensity to choose certain things even though they are 
indifferent.
For the sage, i.e., the perfectly virtuous person, the answer is straightforward. The sage's 
appropriate acts are simultaneously right acts. For him the particular acts that have a 
reasonble defense are precisely the acts that are done with a full understanding of the correct 
pattern of acts into which they fit. So for him the propensity to perform particular appropriate 
acts is extensionally equivalent to the propensity to act from full understanding.39 But the 
sage's reason for performing those acts is that they satisfy the latter condition, not that they 
satisfy the former. Qua conforming to nature, these acts are not indifferent at all. When chosen 
as such, they are "right acts," not merely "appropriate acts," and so there is no reason to 
wonder how it could be the human end, or rational, or virtuous, for the sage to perform them.
For the ordinary person, however, the answer to our question is inevitably less direct. The
specifications that we ordinarily give of our appropriate acts, and of the things that we take to 
be preferable, are deficient in two ways: a) they cannot be guaranteed to specify particular 
acts that are all in accord with the pattern of acts that really are to be performed (i.e., that 
pattern that the sage comprehends), because we do not ordinarily know or correctly assess all 
the circumstances bearing on whether an act is really to be performed; and b) these 
specifications do not exhibit that pattern and the way in which the acts fulfilling them fit into it. 
Thus, a person proposing to do something on the ground that it falls under the concept, 
"honoring one's parents," is neither sure that he will thereby be doing what he really should do 
(or will in fact succeed in doing), nor able to exhibit why honoring one's parents itself is part of 
the correct overall pattern of right acts. We therefore still need to know why an ordinary 
person should regard the terms for what we call appropriate acts as designating what it is 
virtuous or rational, or part of the end, to do.
The reply is that these specifications are what might be called natural and necessary stages in 
an ordinary person's attempt to approximate the sage's complete comprehension of how to act 
and what to choose. According to the Stoics, human beings naturally move toward the sage's 
complete comprehension by beginning with particular impulses (hormai) to particular kinds of 
things, and with tendencies to take particular sorts of actions as justifiable. As they mature, 
reason takes over the systematization of these impulses and tendencies, which is completed 
only very rarely, by the sage.no But they are part of natural human development and cannot 
be bypassed. As a result, even though the full conception of virtue can be possessed only by 
the sage, our conception of it must take it as involving a propensity to perform the acts, and 
choose the things, to which we are directed by these impulses and tendencies. If it did not, 
then we would have no way of giving concrete content to the idea of virtue at all, beyond 
simply the bare idea of conformity to nature.41
It is essential to the Stoic view, thus interpreted, to picture us nonsages as able to distinguish 
a notion of the good from the unsystematized collection of our impulses and our tendencies to 
find certain types of action defensible, but as lacking a full articulation or formulation of that 
notion. And this is in fact exactly how they do picture us. Indeed, the Stoics devote an 
important part of their psychology to explaining how we can arrive at such a notion. We can 
see this in Book 3 of Cicero's De Finibus. Here Cicero tells how the Stoics, in an attempt to 
meet opponents' objections that their ethical view cannot plausibly explain how the notion of 
the good develops in human beings, attempt to describe precisely that development. 42
According to them, in a nutshell, the infant begins by seeking the things that are conducive to 
his own physical survival and integrity. Later, however, the human being supposedly becomes 
attracted to quite different things, which may even be at odds with his own existence. They 
say that once a person reaches a certain maturity, he comes to be able to see a pattern or 
structure in his own previous activity, and that he then comes to value this structure itself 
rather than the things to which he previously was attracted? This pattern, perfectly instantiated 
in the kosmos as a whole (and also in the mind of the sagest), is the notion of the good? It is 
central to the account, however, that humans attain a partial grasp of the notion of the good, 
i.e., of a certain pattern or structure, and of its distinctness from their impulses,,without (in 
most cases) ever becoming able fully to understand and articulate what this pattern is. 
Accordingly, the aims of the ordinary person must be thought of as involving more or less 
distant approximation of the understanding that the sage possesses.
We can now see in summary form how the Stoics could recommend choosing among 
indifferents and claim that doing so is virtuous, rational, and part of the human end. The sage 
makes such choices of things qua fitting the pattern that he comprehends, not qua falling 
under the separate and unsystematized maxims of actions and choice that we employ in our 
ordinary unsagelike way of thinking. So in an important sense he does not choose particular
indifferents at all, qua indifferents. All others, on the other hand, are forced to make such 
choices by their ignorance of the correct overall pattern governing choice and action, and 
simply need to do the best their imperfectly informed reasons can do, by following the maxims 
and impulses that appear advisable. Their choices are in this sense irrational and they are, 
strictly, "fools."46 They choose things that cannot be guaranteed to be right, and they choose 
them under concepts that do not in fact convey the correct rationale for their choices. On the 
other hand, their choices are to. be recommended, because they are the best that human 
beings are capable of short of sagehood, and because the making of them is part of the 
natural and necessary process that human beings go through from birth, toward the eventual 
but usually unobtainable goal of wisdom.
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